











Firms are not islands but are linked together in patterns of co-operation and
afﬁliation. Richardson, 1972
In the recent literature on supply chain management, vertical production
systems are treated as independent entities operating under a given standard of
coordination. If different production systems are not denominated ﬁrms, they are
being treated as if they could be coordinated by some kind of agent holding
sufﬁcient hierarchical power. Moreover, different supply chains are presented as
if they could compete with each other in the marketplace, inviting us to extend the
concept of the typical ﬁrm. However, according to the Coase (1988) deﬁnition, “A
ﬁrm consists of the system of relationships that comes into existence when the
direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.” When we deal with
supply chains, the entrepreneur may or may not exist.
Can supply chains be studied as independent entities? If so, can we interfere in
their organization? What parameters must be considered to bind our actions
toward the design of efﬁcient systems? Provided that theories are abstract
constructions designed to explain empirical regularities, we are looking for a
scientiﬁc explanation for the empirical architecture and dynamics of coordination
of supply systems.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in supply-chain management, which
implies conscious interference. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop a
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necessary to allow for discretionary interference.
The recent literature in this ﬁeld has been advancing toward the development
of a theory, and tools to help manage supply-systems are in demand, by both the
private and public sectors.
Part of the literature has evolved from the pure Industrial Organization
approach, toward the New Institutional Economics, especially incorporating
Transaction Costs and Institutional Environment as important elements in the
architecture of vertical systems.
1This includes agribusiness systems, where
several contributions have recently been reported (Frank, and Henderson, 1992;
Zylbersztajn, 1996; Mahoney, Crank, and Lajili, 1994). Recent developments are
trying to merge both theories, Industrial Organization and Transaction Cost
Economics, as discussed by Joskow (1995), bringing new insights and enhancing
the understanding of the dynamics of supply systems.
At the origins of the concept, the French school of “ﬁlie `res” contributed to this
evolution, based on the utilization of tools focused on monopolistic behavior of
speciﬁc players throughout the chain, stressing power as the key element. More
recently, the Dutch school has been producing considerable literature that is
shaping the concept of agri-chain management, as can be seen in Trienekens,
Beers, and Beulens (1998), and Trienekens and Zuurbier (1996). This last
approach considers the vertical chain a manageable system, thus treating the
agribusiness system as an economic entity, which is supposedly manageable.
Some authors from the Dutch school are applying the theoretical support from the
modern theory of organizations while others are basing their work on an ad-hoc
approach.
The motivation for this study can be expressed by a single question. How far
have we moved toward building a useful tool to architect supply systems or
chains? By architect, we mean shaping organizations and institutions that will
support efﬁcient supply systems and enforcing coordination to help implement the
necessary contractual adaptations of speciﬁc systems when facing external
shocks.
Testing hypotheses, designing new supply systems, and promoting adaptations,
implies that we are assuming an applicable theory of supply-system management,
expected to be general enough to be applied to any case of production system
coordination.
This paper stems from the concept that it is not necessary to develop a new
theory or a so-called chain science; it is sufﬁcient to apply the modern theory of
organizations. Therefore it is feasible to deal with supply chains as a particular
case within vertical production systems management.
To address this issue, this conceptual study is structured in ﬁve parts. The
second part places the concept of supply system into a Coasian framework. Part
three deals with the concept of coordination and its limits. In part four, the
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theory is discussed based on existing tools offered by the theory of organizations.
Finally, part ﬁve presents concluding comments and concepts that deserve further
attention.
This paper deals with the deﬁnition of “strictly coordinated supply systems”
(SCSS), based on the theory of vertical integration proposed by Williamson
(1975). The concept of SCSS is introduced and contrasted with Porter’s deﬁnition
of strategic groups.
THE COASIAN SUPPLY-SYSTEM
The key development proposed by Coase in his seminal paper “The Nature of the
Firm” was a challenge to the traditional concept of the ﬁrm as a production
function. Replacing the traditional neoclassical approach, Coase introduced the
view of the ﬁrm as a “nexus of contracts.” One implication of this approach is an
expansion of the scope of the theory of the ﬁrm to incorporate new forms of
productive arrangements increasingly important in modern economies, such as
strategic alliances, franchises, sub-contracting, and other non-standard contractual
arrangements. The evolution of the modern theory of the ﬁrm challenges both the
concept of a ﬁrm as a production function and the traditional treatment to deﬁne
the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
The new theory of the ﬁrm evolved around the discussion of hierarchical
power. On the one hand, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) maintain that the ﬁrm is not
distinguished from the market by ﬁat power, since one can always ﬁre the
supplier. The authors agree with Coase in that the costs of using markets is the
basic explanation for the existence of the ﬁrm, but add that one could stress that
lowering costs of management would increase the advantage of the ﬁrm. Hart
(1989) stresses the deﬁnition of property rights as the key element in deﬁning the
ﬁrm, contrasting the model with the neoclassical, transaction cost, and principal-
agent models.
On the other hand, Richardson (1972) introduces the supply chain perspective
when proposing that sub-contracting is becoming more widespread and: “...a
dense network of arrangements links the industries of different countries.”. The
author exempliﬁes this with a large retailer —Marks & Spencer —, proposing that
more than just a retail chain, this company has the capacity to architect complex
patterns of coordinated activities, stressing that this capacity to coordinate
emerges without any shareholding in its suppliers’ ﬁrms. This is the core concept
revisited in the present paper. As stated by Picot, Ripperger and Wolff (1996),
ﬁrms’ boundaries are fading, even more acutely than Coase had anticipated, since
hierarchical mechanisms can be found between ﬁrms and market mechanisms,
and high-powered incentives can be found within the ﬁrms as well.
2
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coordination within the new approach of the theory of the ﬁrm. If the traditional
hierarchical power is no longer the key element distinguishing the ﬁrm from the
market, there still must be some form of coordinating power present to explain the
maintenance of the complex system of contracts that characterizes the supply
chain.
The Limits of Hierarchy
Either approached as a production function or as a nexus of contracts, the ﬁrm
demands capacity of coordination. The concept of hierarchy treated by William-
son (1975) hits the heart of this issue. The ﬁrm, once seen under the lens of the
New Institutional Economics, is approached, not only as a set of contracts, but
also as contracts that are deﬁning a speciﬁc mode of governance. Governance
modes range from markets to hierarchies. The ﬁrst applies when the characteris-
tics of the transactions involved are governed predominantly by the price
mechanism. This situation is a particular case in which the price signals are
sufﬁcient to promote adaptations in the set of contracts.
However, in a real world setting, the price mechanism is one speciﬁc case among
governance modes aligned with and deﬁned by the characteristics of transactions.
Nevertheless, contracts of a ﬁrm, both external and internal, are designed to promote
efﬁcient coordination. It follows that a broad scope of contractual arrangements is
observed, ranging from simple spot markets to strictly hierarchical modes of
governance, since they are simultaneously determined by the characteristics of
transactions and the institutional environment (Williamson, 1985).
Looking deep into the contractual ﬁrm, the concept of hierarchy can be
considered fragile as utilized in the traditional sense. Not only are internal
contracts susceptible to breaches, but also all characteristics that govern transac-
tion between ﬁrms, can also be reproduced within ﬁrms (i.e., hierarchical
governance), as a result of agency problems derived from asymmetric informa-
tion, opportunism, and emergence of quasi-rents in transactions classiﬁed as
hierarchical. This reinforces the proposition that contracts have a cost to be
fulﬁlled, both on an ex-ante and on an ex-post basis, and within or between ﬁrms.
Even in contracts conducted strictly inside the ﬁrm, discrepancies can emerge
that cause misalignment between principals and agents. Therefore, hierarchies
have limits and cannot be seen as monolithic structures in which orders are
obeyed on an inﬂexible basis. On the contrary, modern theory of organizations
focuses on the contracts through their dimensions of motivation and control, in
order to achieve a pre-determined objective where disputes for residual decision
rights are very frequent.
If contractual management is important within a single ﬁrm, its signiﬁcance is
magniﬁed when dealing with systems of ﬁrms, as in the coordinated supply systems.
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Of the managerial theories under construction that focus on supply chain
management, each contains elements of hierarchical coordination. In order to
improve these theoretical bodies, one needs to consider two aspects. First, what
are the existing explanations for governance determinants that can be applied to
supply chains, and second, what are the speciﬁc aspects of supply chains (if they
exist) that indicate the need for development of a speciﬁc theory.
Different managerial theories of ﬁrms have been developed, ranging from
ﬁnancial to human resources and technological management. In other words, they
were developed with a focus on the managerial functions faced by the decision-
makers and therefore show a strong applied orientation.
The organizational theories of the ﬁrm (Millgrom and Roberts) arise from the
contractual perspective and apply the theory to different managerial problems,
such as agency, labor motivation and controls, ownership structure, separation of
property and control, and corporate ﬁnance. Incorporating the Coasian approach
within the supply chain concept raises at least three challenges to both academics
and managers:
First, what tools exist that allow for discretionary interference in supply
chains? In dealing with the coordination of contracts whose locus is spread
throughout the chain, how are hierarchical and control abilities deﬁned? If
different governance modes can be observed within a single supply chain, it is
expected that managerial discretion will be employed with considerable efforts
toward motivation and control mechanisms, all associated with transaction costs
relevant to supply chain management.
Second, supply management is affected by the enforcement ability related to
the speciﬁc system. The complexity and importance of this problem are particu-
larly present when supply chains surpass country borders, as is often the case,
being affected by institutional conditions deﬁned within each distinct country
environment. This imposes extra constraints on the implementation of managerial
discretion because the decision-maker not only has to interact with agents
dispersed throughout the chain, but also has to induce adaptations as a reaction to
different signals provided by the distinct institutional structures.
The third consideration has to do with the dynamics of supply chain
reorganization. Chains are rarely linear and monolithic; different sub-systems
dealing with the same product can be found, but obeying different mechanisms of
coordination. Therefore, different sub-systems are simultaneously coordinated, all
related to a single product, and competing with each other for the ﬁnal consumer.
This concept poses the problem of deﬁning limits on supply chains that
considers both, bound by the ﬁnal product, and based on the discretionary
capacity to manage or coordinate power. The managerial ability results from the
capacity to devise and implement vertically-coordinated transactions with well-
Exploring the Limits of the Coasian Firm 253deﬁned motivation and control tools attuned to the needs of vertical coordination.
Different systems demand different coordination tools, depending on the com-
petitive strategy adopted and the frequency and effect of external impacts that
demand coordinated adaptations.
Proposition 1
The central proposition of this paper is that supply systems may be approached
as a magniﬁed set of contracts which architecture results from the alignment of the
transaction characteristics, and the institutional environment. Alignment means
designing efﬁcient contract arrangements, minimizing production and transaction
costs, and considering the institutional framework that binds the set of transactions.
Managing ﬁrms is a very demanding task that has been studied for many years.
The management of complex supply systems is still a far more complex concept,
both in theoretical and practical terms. In fact, practice seems to be demanding
rapid theoretical improvements given that an efﬁcient architecture of production
systems augments its competitive capacity. In order to understand the conditions
of implementing managerial discretion, the characteristics of supply system
coordination will be discussed.
If different supply systems are competing in the marketplace, the question is
whether we can admit the possibility of a central hierarchical coordination or if,
on the contrary, the systems with different designs will emerge spontaneously in
the marketplace. Problems of deﬁnition of property rights over residuals (distrib-
utive aspect) turns out to be of magniﬁed importance in the design of incentive
mechanisms to maintain the structure of the supply chain.
SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION
The objective of the present section is to explore the concept of coordination
developed by Williamson (1985) and to discuss its application to supply systems.
The concept of strictly coordinated sub-systems and strategic systems will be
explored.
Adaptability of Contracts
External impacts are continuously affecting the contracts within any speciﬁc
supply system. However, changes of both an internal and external nature are
relevant. For example, technological changes can affect the speciﬁcity of assets or
the uncertainty related to the transaction. Also, shifts in the institutional
environment might have an impact on the conditions in which the transaction is
carried out, affecting the costs of governance.
If changes of different natures are in motion, the relevant question becomes
how to deal with the adaptability of existing contracts throughout the supply
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(1996) based on the framework proposed by Williamson (1985).
Ex-post contractual adaptability is required in all governance modes, from
markets to hierarchies. The determinants of contractual ﬂexibility are associated
with the characteristics of transactions. However, in the case of adaptation of a
magniﬁed set of contracts within a supply system, one must be concerned with the
adaptation of a sequence of transactions potentially governed by distinct modes.
Key elements proposed by Zylbersztajn (1995) include the existence of vertical
sub-systems deﬁned by strictly coordinated transactions with speciﬁc tools to
promote the identiﬁcation (and even the anticipation) of external shocks, the
existence of information systems that allow for rapid diffusion of relevant
information, the managerial capacity of each agent to react in face of external
shocks and the capacity to coordinate the adaptation. In the presence of such
specialized mechanisms, the supply chain will approach a traditional Coasian ﬁrm.
Key questions are a) how rapidly can relevant information ﬂow through the
system, b) how do the agents react in terms of cooperative adjustments, and c)
which organizations have been built to deal with non-cooperative adjustments?
When discussing adaptation, Williamson (1991) suggests three types of
disturbances based on the way they interfere with the contractual arrangement.
Inconsequential, consequential, and highly consequential disturbances must be
contrasted with the adaptation tools available to deal with any given disturbance.
The author suggests that distinct types of adaptation are necessary to correct
eventual misalignment. Autonomous adaptation requires no effort, being entirely
dependent on the price mechanism. Coordinated adjustments are needed when
prices do not carry the necessary information to promote the adjustment in a
timely fashion.
The ﬁrst level is strictly autonomous, adaptation. The other levels are classiﬁed
as: mainly autonomous, mainly coordinated, and strictly coordinated. The
different degrees of intervention are associated with increasing degrees of asset
speciﬁcity.
Adaptability and Strategic Systems
Supply systems operate in environments characterized by changing levels of
asset speciﬁcity associated to different competitive strategies which may affect
transactions throughout the system, such as vertical differentiation, market
segmentation, innovation, time speciﬁcations associated with minimum stocks,
among others.
The deﬁnition of competitive strategy is twofold. First, it is the set of
investments in productive resources made by the ﬁrm in order to attend the
requirements of the prevailing competitive pattern (the set of competitive
variables used by rivals in a speciﬁc market, such as price, quality, brand name,
etc.). Also, competitive strategy includes the ability to change the competitive
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transactions by demanding the adoption of a new governance mode.
Moreover, transaction attributes may also be affected by new standards of
quality required by public policy, or associated with supply management. In the
case of food systems, speciﬁc attributes of food consumption required by changes
in consumer preferences, strict legislation protecting consumers rights, and
environmental awareness are all examples of increasing levels of speciﬁcity,
which make it more difﬁcult to rely on autonomous adaptations in supply systems.
Therefore, both coordinated and strictly coordinated adaptation modes will be
demanded in most of the modern supply systems, and because of this, contracts
may replace price-induced adjustments. In a competitive environment, a ﬁrst
mover advantage can be gained by implementing adaptation before other systems.
For that reason, the existence of vertically organized sub-systems is proposed,
assuming they are based on the coordination abilities of their agents, who compete
with other sub-systems. Both cooperative and hierarchical adaptations may take place.
The concept of strategy at the ﬁrm level is augmented to incorporate strategic
positions of speciﬁc vertical sub-systems in which adaptations are predominantly
of the strictly coordinated mode. In fact, this type of supply system can be
represented as a set of contracts, all strictly ordered and very similar to the typical
contractual arrangement inside the ﬁrm, albeit lacking strict hierarchical power.
Figure 1 shows the representation of a supply system that includes different
strictly coordinated sub-systems. The motivation for individual ﬁrms to establish
contracts of a strictly coordinated mode is determined by the characteristics of
transactions prevailing throughout the system and also by the competitive
Figure 1. Strictly Coordinated Vertical Sub-systems
256 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 2/1999pressures imposed by other coordinated sets of contracts. Costs of coordinating
the entire system are too high, assuming the possibility of opportunistic hold-up
problems, resulting in the deﬁnition of a sub-set of closely related agents
functioning as a close-knit group compiled for speciﬁc purposes. In these cases
there are advantages to develop collective actions.
Distinct contractual arrangements are proposed and enforced by the group,
through close monitoring. The architecture of coordinated contracts may well
show superior efﬁciency by deﬁning new standards for the other agents of the
supply system, outside the group, thus motivating the diffusion of the new
contractual standard.
The motivation for organizing sub-systems originates from lower transaction
costs and close monitoring possibilities. Therefore, the identiﬁcation of external
shocks or strategic opportunities (step 1), renegotiations of contractual arrange-
ments (step 2), implementation (step 3), and ex-post monitoring (step 4) become
a sequence of feasible steps to be adjusted rapidly, aligned with the competitive
environment or strategic needs.
One might argue that the Porter (1979) concept of strategic groups is enough
to explain why groups of ﬁrms adopt similar strategies. The author states that: “An
industry can be viewed as composed of clusters of groups of ﬁrms, where each
group consists of ﬁrms following similar strategies in terms of key decision
variables... I deﬁne such groups as strategic groups”. Among these strategic
groups there may be important mobility barriers even if the entry barriers are low
for the whole industry, which can explain different levels of return among
strategic groups.
As mentioned before, if strategies alter the attributes of transactions by
increasing asset speciﬁcity, uncertainty, or frequency, contracts may be com-
mended, replacing pure market mechanisms, which will result in strictly coordi-
nated sub-systems.
Porter’s deﬁnition of strategic groups merely assumes the existence of a group
of ﬁrms adopting similar strategies, without any cooperative or hierarchical
motivation, while the concept of a strictly coordinated supply system is dependent
on cooperation and/or hierarchical power.
In that sense the coordination presents in the concept of strategic groups is of
strictly autonomous adaptation while in the concept of strictly coordinated supply
systems the coordinated and strictly coordinated modes are relevant.
Another distinction between both concepts might be related to the timing of
adjustment. While the strategic group is the result of long term continuous
adjustments, the strictly coordinated system allows for rapid adjustments in face
of external shocks. It is possible that both concepts will become more similar
provided there is enough time for ﬁrms to adjust and adopt cooperative strategies
as a result of repetitive transactions.
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Firms do compete in the marketplace, and this is a cornerstone of the
economics literature. If a Coasian approach to the ﬁrm is adopted, it is expected
that alternative contractual arrangements will affect the standards of competition
between ﬁrms, incorporating transaction costs into the traditional production
costs.
If productive systems are treated as presumed to be magniﬁed sets of
contractual arrangements, they will also differ not only in terms of costs of
producing goods and services, but in terms of transaction costs. The key question
becomes: Who is in charge here? Who is the coordinating agent central to the
traditional economic theory?
We suggest that there will be a leading ﬁrm in most cases, which will assume
the coordination role. This leading position arises from the strategic leadership,
not necessarily connected to business size, technological domain, or the position
in the vertical chain. Many examples are available showing that small companies
may play this role and build a strictly coordinated sub-system to explore a market
niche.
Illycafe, a well-known Italian espresso coffee company, is a good example of
SCSS in the coffee agribusiness system. The company’s main competitive
strategy is focused on vertical differentiation based on high quality espresso
coffee. To build and preserve its reputation, Illycafe has had to strictly coordinate
the coffee sub-system, which includes idiosyncratic contracts, joint ventures, and
informal contracts both upstream (coffee producers) and downstream (coffee
machine supplier, coffee shops, franchising systems, and so on). In spite of being
a small player, Illy is the strategic leader in this sub-system, though there are
larger and more powerful players downstream.
Another example is provided by new seed companies, such as Monsanto or
Novartis, originated from the chemical sector. They are building SCSS in
soybean, corn, and other agricultural genetically modiﬁed products (GMOs) in
order to guarantee the return of their investment in R&D. Non-standard contracts
with farmers, edible oils industry, research institutions, and farmers are emerging
as a way to capture returns for their R&D investments.
The two examples show that it does not matter if the leader is downstream or
upstream in the vertical system or if it is large or small.
If the strategy is successful and higher returns result, other companies may
follow the leaders, adopting the same strategy of expanding the strictly coordi-
nation sub-system, moving towards a strategic system. As the success of the
strategy depends on adequate governance structures, the mobility barriers may
increase, keeping proﬁts from being eroded by potential competition.
The adaptation of contracts in production systems is entirely based on
negotiation among different agents. They will form chains based on dependent
258 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 2/1999strategies, mostly represented and reﬂected in speciﬁc contractual architectures.
Some contractual arrangements may provide superior (efﬁcient) coordination and
therefore will tend to expand to other agents. The rate of diffusion will depend on
several aspects, some of which are:
• Responsiveness of consumers to the speciﬁc attributes associated with the
strictly coordinated sub-system, which might impose new standards, changing
the competitive pattern;
• Monitoring costs associated with the set of transactions;
• Institutional environment, providing standards and controls;
• Self-enforcement structures designed by the participating players; and
• Internal mechanisms to resolve disputes, dealing with distributive effects or
contractual adaptation.
To conclude, this chapter is proposing the existence of vertical arrangements that
reproduce the contractual architecture deﬁned at the ﬁrm level. It is not
spontaneous and the agents are not anonymous. The motivation to organize a
sub-system comes from market strategies and efﬁciency to lower transaction
costs, and therefore is a result of the search for efﬁciency and higher returns.
However, these arrangements are relatively stable, making it possible to encour-
age the deﬁnition of new standards or to perish in light of other systems organized
in different ways and competing for the same consumer.
The dynamics of sub-system competition have yet to be well understood, but
are associated to the concept of supply system management, and particularly
related to Williamson’s approach to vertical coordination.
LIMITS OF SUPPLY SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
In order to develop a theory to address supply system management, some building
blocks must be put together. This topic will address three aspects: ﬁrst, the basic
theoretical foundations provided by the New Institutional Economics; second, the
Williamson (1996) concept of a remediableness standard, applied to organizations
and supply system management; and ﬁnally, two limiting and related aspects
associated to coordination failure: the hold-up problem and the aspects of
contractual continuity.
Towards a Theory of Supply System Coordination
The basic proposal for using Transaction Cost Economics to study supply
system coordination has been in the literature for some time. Based on William-
son, there are three points to recognize:
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complex contractual arrangements shaped by the characteristics of transactions;
• Discrete contractual law can be aligned with each governance mode, providing
the theoretical basis for matching transaction characteristics with prevailing
contractual modes; and
• First order economizing is considered primarily as an explanation for observed
governance modes.
To extend this causal relation from ﬁrms to supply systems, one must amplify the
scope of analysis, maintaining the same assumptions. Therefore, the governance
mode is a function of transaction characteristics and institutional environment.
The system might be structured as a set of closely coordinated sub-systems,
allowing for adaptive responses to changes in economic environment and
strategies of competing supply systems. It is therefore necessary to consider some
kind of hierarchical power associated with contractual motivation to promote the
four steps described in the previous chapter.
Considered as an organic entity, supply systems are subject to reorientation,
constantly passing through the redesign of speciﬁc contractual architecture.
Managing supply systems is synonymous to constructing contracts that are
potentially able to deal with the four steps in a superior manner. This approach
leads us to treat the competitiveness of supply-systems as their ability to promote
continuous and self-sustained contractual arrangements in the expanded market
arena where not only ﬁrms are competing directly, but also the systems in which
they are embedded.
Supply systems will continuously be created and will also continuously
disappear, as new arrangements with sufﬁcient coordination power are con-
structed to replace inefﬁcient systems. In many cases, product differentiation
associated with changing asset speciﬁcity will shape a completely new supply
related to the same product.
Remediableness Standard
The concept has been developed to deal primarily with institutional designs that
are supposedly superior but in practice are not suitable for implementation
Williamson (1996). In his paper, Williamson gives as an example the sugar
program in the U.S., which, besides being economically inefﬁcient, still persists
despite the costs of its implementation. Still at the macro level, Shirley (1997)
discusses how international agencies propose political reforms that are ﬁne in
textbooks but not feasible in reality.
What does the concept have to teach us, from the point of view of supply system
management?
First, the architecture of supply systems is devised by human efforts. Being so,
by its own nature and as a result of the difﬁculties with the application of the
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either due to the high costs of monitoring transactions or institutional barriers that
are not removable in the short run.
Second, governance modes are rarely transferable from one country to another,
given the importance of institutional settings. Simple remedies are difﬁcult to
prescribe without a better knowledge of the patient.
Third, inefﬁcient supply chains might persist even in the long run, when there
are distributive impacts resulting from the new proposed architecture. In this
sense, some supply systems are managed in such a way as to be inefﬁcient.
Rent-seeking considerations apply here, and high competition pressures on agents
are expected.
The implication is that governmental interference in SCSS may show no results
in many cases, since it is very difﬁcult to understand and to interfere in the
complex contractual set.
Remediableness standard refers to a concept that applies to many cases where
superior coordination modes are devised but their implementation shows obsta-
cles not entirely anticipated.
Many studies of supply system coordination propose solutions, which are
dependent on costless cooperation among agents throughout the system. The
contractual approach to supply systems allows us to identify transaction costs
associated to opportunistic behavior in the presence of quasi-rents related to
highly speciﬁc assets.
Supply systems are sets of contracts that present situations of asymmetric and
imperfect information leading to tensions which might inhibit the achievement of
efﬁcient coordination. Therefore, benign coordination, which many times is
considered an implicit assumption, must be reconsidered under the lens of the
economy of organizations. Coordination has costs associated to its implementa-
tion, so there are beneﬁts to harvest. Unfortunately, there are variables out of the
manager’s control, which could, in many cases, serve as an excuse for failure.
There are two relevant aspects related to coordination failure: contractual
hold-up and contractual continuity.
Conditions of Contractual Hold-up and Continuity
Once considered a nexus of contracts, the supply system is subject to the very
same problems discussed in the literature related to contractual hold-up. In order
to construct manageable contractual arrangements, it becomes necessary to focus
on the question of contractual stability.
In a recent paper, Zylbersztajn (1997) reviewed the theory of contractual
hold-up. Basing himself on Klein (1992), he considers that contracts can be seen
as instruments designed to allow the engagement of the parties in an effort of joint
production, reducing the risks of contractual hold-up. The study focused on
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agement problems.
According to the Transaction Cost Economics literature, incomplete contracts
are a consequence of bounded rationality, being deﬁned by situations where
information exists, but is inaccessible or the costs to obtain and process further
information are too high to ﬁll the contractual gaps. As it is impossible to design
complete contracts, the parties normally live with the existence of gaps that, in
case of litigation arising from the dispute over rents related to the existence of
speciﬁc assets, might require third parties to deal with the contracts. Here, the
unrealistic assumption of benign cooperation in supply chains (relations based on
trust) comes into play, being just one possibility among a more complex set of
situations.
The solution to the problem involves the design of incentives aligned with the
interests of contractual parties, added to monitoring mechanisms that permit all
parties to access relevant information when needed, and ﬁnally, the design of
enforcement mechanisms to cope with opportunistic behavior. Contractual en-
forcement is discussed by North (1990) and Klein (1992) and involves at least two
dimensions—the ﬁrst of private and the second of public enforcement mechanisms.
Private enforcement might function in sub-systems where agents interact
intensively with one another and are not anonymous agents. The particular case
of strictly coordinated sub-systems appears to be aligned with the following
comment proposed by North (1990):
The most likely and empirically observable state in which the parties to exchange
have a great deal of knowledge about each other and are involved in repeated dealings.
In such a world, the measurement costs of transacting are very low because of a dense
social network of interaction. Cheating, shirking and opportunism are limited or absent
because they do not pay.
Legal enforcement is important in cases where private mechanisms do not
function adequately or when unexpected disturbances in institutional or compet-
itive environment occur.
When the costs of breaking the contract are higher than the beneﬁts derived
from the breach, then the contract is expected to last. In the presence of bilateral
dependence, one might anticipate low monitoring costs, since both parties are
engaged in continuing the contractual relation.
Joskow (1987) on the US coal industry conclude that long term contracts are
associated with high levels of asset speciﬁcity characterizing the transaction. For
agri-chains, ex-post contractual hold-up is also shown to be related to the level of
asset speciﬁcity of transactions as discussed by Zylbersztajn and Lazzarinni
(1997). This indicates the importance of transaction-speciﬁc investments made to
support the relation. The last study shows that ex-post contractual duration is also
affected by the degree of speciﬁc investments.
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To attain an adequate level of coordination in the strictly coordinated supply
chain, not only must one consider good intentions, but a deep understanding of the
nature of transactions throughout the system is also necessary. In many cases, the
level of asset speciﬁcity is very high, demanding speciﬁc contractual controls only
feasible within small, close-knit groups. On the other hand, manageable sub-
systems can be structured in an efﬁcient manner.
The institutional and organizational structure that binds a speciﬁc supply
system will also affect the degree of manageability. Strictly enforced rules, either
by public or private modes, will affect the coordination capabilities developed
within a deﬁned system.
Returning to the original questions that motivated this study, a strictly
coordinated supply system can indeed be considered an individual entity, if a
sufﬁcient degree of control can be enforced. This will be more likely to happen
with individual sub-systems than with a highly aggregated system. Controls and
enforcement are the roots of managerial discretion. Therefore, sub-systems can be
constructed and different mechanisms of motivation and controls can be imple-
mented, providing support to the concept of supply system management.
Finally, the key elements to frame the study of supply systems are already in
the literature of the economics of contracts and organizations. It is just a matter
of practicing and adapting. Several questions remain open and require further
study. How do we gather indications of potential sub-systems to be developed?
How do we enhance control capabilities within systems? How do we follow the
dynamics of diffusion of SCSS? When should we consider a red light for supply
systems without conditions to last in the long run? These are all relevant
questions, the importance of which supply system managers should be aware.
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NOTES
1. From now on, the term supply-chain will be replaced by supply-systems in order to emphasize
the deﬁnition of supply system as a contractual nexus and not only as a technical transformation
production chain.
2. The most striking example of faded boundaries is the “Lopez model” for the car industry- an
industrial condominium where different companies share the line of production . Bilateral
Exploring the Limits of the Coasian Firm 263speciﬁc investments are made, creating a hostage model of contracting such as that suggested
by Williamson (1985, Chapter 5).
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